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THE APHORISMS
OF
THE VAISESHIKA.
—
SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.
—

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
Aphorisms
(Vaiśeṣika)

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THE APHORISMS
OF THE
VAIS'ESHIKA PHILOSOPHY,
OF
K A Ṇ A' D A
WITH
ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY
BY
S' A N K A R A M I S' R A .

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1851. }

THE VAIS'ESHIKA DOCTRINE.

INTRODUCTION.

A.—[THE commentary, by S'ANKARA MIS'RA, the "Adornment of the Aphorisms of KANĀDA," (*Sūtrapaskāra*), commences as follows].

B.—Salutation to the venerable Ganes'a! Victorious is the man-lion [Vishṇu] dear to [the goddess] Lakshmi! Om! I salute Hara [or Siva] in the lap of whose high-wreathed matted locks the river of the gods disports, and whose forehead is resplendent with [the moon] the lover of the night!

C.—My reverence is ever [due] to KANĀDA and to BHAVANĀTMA—the two through whom I have become thoroughly proficient in the *Vais'esika* doctrine.

D.—Like [that funambulist] the spider [which runs on a thread—*sūtra*—] my boldness also in this case will attain success, whilst I proceed, where I have no [other] support, in reliance upon [those threads—*sūtra*—] the Aphorisms alone [and not on any commentary*].

* —श्री गणेशाय नमः । श्री लक्ष्मीनसिंहे नमः ।

E.—Certain discriminating persons afflicted by the triad of evils [see—Sāṅkhya Lecture—No. 80—], investigating the means of the cessation of the triad of evils, discovered, in various Scriptures, law treatises, histories, and sacred poems, that the means thereof is merely the perception of the real nature of Soul. Moreover, wishing to know the path which might be the means of attaining to that, they approached the preeminently benevolent sage KANĀDA.

F.—Now KANĀDA, moreover, the great saint, possessing a knowledge of the truth, freedom from passion, and superhuman power [—see Sāṅkhya Lecture—No. 13—], having reflected in his mind—as follows—viz.: “The preeminent way to the
“attainment of the perception of the real nature of Soul is the
“knowledge of truth [derived] from [the knowledge of] the
“[mutual] agreements and disagreements of the Six Catego-
“ries [into which the “omne scibile” is distributed];—and this
“[knowledge of the mutual relations of the Categories] may be
“completed, without toil on the part of these [enquirers]
“by means of *duty* [of the kind—to be described elsewhere as]
“characterised by *forbearance* [from works either positively evil
“or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory
“fruits];—therefore I [KANĀDA] shall, in the first place, declare
“what is *duty*—both as regards its characteristic mark and its

धोम् । ऊर्ध्ववद्वज्रटाकूटक्रीडाक्रीडसुरायगम् । नमामि यामि-
नीकान्तकान्तभालखलं चरम् । १ । वाभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे स-
म्यग्युत्पादितो ऽस्य हम् । कषादभवनायाभ्यां ताभ्यां भम
नमः सदा । २ । सूक्ष्माभावखम्बेन निराखम्बे ऽपि गच्छतः ।
द्यौर्लोकवन्ममाथ च साहसं सिद्धिनेष्यति । ३ ।

“generic nature; and, immediately thereafter, I shall declare
 “the Six Categories by [the regular process—referred to by
 “Mr. Colebrooke at p. 264 of his Essays vol. 1. viz.,] enunci-
 “ation, definition, and examination:”—having settled this in
 his mind,—in order to [bespeak] the attention of these [en-
 quirers aforesaid]—he makes an offer* [in the shape of the
 Aphorism, No. 1, here following].

THE APHORISMS OF THE 1ST DIURNAL SECTION OF
 THE 1ST LECTURE.

The subject pro- } अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ १ ॥
posed.

No. 1. Now, therefore, we shall describe duty.

a.—[The commentator, on this, remarks as follows]—By
 saying “Now”—he implies [that the enunciation of this Apho-

* —तापचयपराहता विवेकिनस्तापचयनिवृत्तिनिदानमनुस-
 न्धामा नाना अतिसृतीतिहासपुरायेष्वात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारमेव त-
 दुपायमाकलयाम्यभूत्सत्त्वाभिज्ञेनुभूतमपि पन्थानं विज्ञासमानाः
 परमकारणिकं कथादमुनिमुपसेदुरथ कथादोऽपि मर्चिस्तत्त्वज्ञान-
 वैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः यथा पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्व-
 ज्ञानमेवात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारप्राप्तये परमपन्था इति मनसि कृत्वा
 तच्च निवृत्तिसत्त्वयाङ्गमादेतेषामनायासेन सिद्ध्यतीति लक्षणतः
 स्वरूपतस्तच्च धर्ममेव प्रथममुपदिशाम्यनन्तरं यद्यपि पदार्थानुद्देशल-
 क्षणपरीक्षाभिरुपदेक्ष्यामीति इति निधाम तेषामवधानाय प्रति-
 जानीते ।

ism comes] immediately after [the intimation of] the desire of the disciples [to be informed as to how they may escape from the triad of evils]. By saying "Therefore"—he means—since disciples, apt to hear &c, and free from malice, have come to me.*

b.—[The commentary then goes on to offer an alternative explanation of these words—the remarks having much the same drift as those at the opening of the *Muktāvali* (the commentary on the *Bhāṣā-parichchheda*) on the import of a "benediction" (*mangala*)—which the word *atha* "now" is held to stand for.† After disposing of this matter, the commentator proceeds to say—as follows]—Now he [KARṢA] declares [or defines] the thing which he tabled‡ [in his first Aphorism—viz., *duty*].

The means of
emancipation.

यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

No. 2.—Duty (*dharma*) is that from which there results 'emancipation' (*nihsreyasa*) through 'exaltation' (*abhyudaya*).

a.—[In explanation of these terms the commentator tells us that] "exaltation" means [the being exalted by] the "knowledge of reality," and "emancipation" means the "absolutely final cessation of pain;" and "duty" is that from which come both [of these].§

b.—But then [—exclaim the consultants of KARṢA—] the evidence [of your assertion] that the duty [that consists] of

* —अथेति शिष्याकांक्षानन्तर्यमाह । अत इति यतः श्रवणादि
पटवोऽनसूयकाश्चान्तेवासिन उपसेदुरित्यर्थः ॥

† —यद्वा । अयमन्वो मङ्गलार्थः । (‡)—अथ प्रतिज्ञातमर्थमाह ॥

§ —अभ्युदयसंज्ञानं । निःश्रेयसमात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिस्त-
दुभयं यतः स धर्मः ॥

forbearance [from works either positively evil or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory fruits] is the means of [attaining to] emancipation through the knowledge of truth —[the evidence of this—we say—] is the *Veda*. [Now] we [the present enquirers] deny the authority of the mere *Veda*—for it has the faults of being false, self-destructive, and tautological. That it is false [is proved] by a son's *not* being born even after there has been performed the [ceremony of] *putreshī* [or 'sacrifice for the sake of a son'—which ceremony, the *Veda* promised, was to lead to the birth of a son].*

c.—[After citing examples—which we here pretermit—of what they take to be self-contradiction and tautology in the *Veda*, the objectors go on to say that] neither is there anything that shows that the *Veda* is an instrument of right knowledge†, [and that, in short] the whole matter is a mass of uncertainty‡.

d.—[By way of reply to all these objections] therefore, [says the commentator] he [KARṢA] declares§ [as follows].

*Why the Veda is held to be
an authority in the matter.*

तद्वचनादात्म्यप्रामाण्यम् । ३ ।

No. 3.—As it is the declaration thereof, there is an authority [or a right to be received as evidence] in the *Veda*.

* —ननु निवृत्तिवृत्तौ धर्मस्तत्त्वज्ञानद्वारा निःश्रेयसहेतुरित्यत्र श्रुतिः प्रामाण्यम् । श्रुतेरेव प्रामाण्यं वयं विप्रतिपद्यामहे । अनृत-
व्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः । पुनरेष्टी कृतावामपि पुनश्चासुत्यादादनृत-
त्वम् ।

† —नचात्म्यप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादकं किञ्चिदस्ति ।

‡ —सर्वमेतदाकुलम् ।

§ अत आह ।

a.—The word “thereof” refers to *God*—although the name [indicated by the pronominal has not been mentioned before—or] is not standing near—for *He* is understood to be meant, from the notoriety* [of the use of a pronominal—like the English “He” or “Him” with a capital—when speaking of Him though not mentioned, on the occasion, previously].

b.—[And if you think that *Kaṇāda* had no right to employ a pronominal where the name of what was thereby implied had not gone close before—then you must extend your censure—which you are not likely to do—to *GAUTAMA*;—for the word ‘God’ is here indicated by a pronominal]—just as in the aphorism of *GAUTAMA* [—the 57th in the 2nd Chapter—viz.,] “The unauthoritativeness thereof [may be inferred] from its faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology”—[as, I repeat,—in this aphorism of *GAUTAMA*—]the *Veda* too, which had not been mentioned near the place, is indicated by the expression “thereof.”†

c.—And thus [the meaning of the 3d aphorism appears to be this that] the authoritativeness [—i. e., as remarked in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, the being the instrument of correct Knowledge‡—] of the *Veda* (*āmudāya*) is [derived] from its being “the declaration thereof”—i. e., a revelation by *Him* who is the Lord.§

* —तदित्यनुपपन्नमपि प्रसिद्धिचिह्नतवेत्यरं पराचक्षति ।

† —यथा तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्य इति गौतमीयसूत्रे तच्छब्देनानुपपन्नती ऽपि वेदः परामृश्यते ।

‡ —प्रमायाः करणं प्रमायम् ।

§ —तथाच तदचनान्तेनेत्यरेण प्रथमनादायावत्स वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

d.—Or [if you do not choose to allow that the ' pronominal refers to *God*, you may say that] the "thereof" refers to *duty*—which [term] does stand near* [—being mentioned in the preceding aphorism, No. 2].

e.—[Passing over the commentatorial details relative to this alternative view of the import of the pronominal, we go on to where, as the commentator tells us,] having, in pursuance of the wish of the disciples, explained what *duty* is, as regards its nature and its characteristic [i. e. as regards its *genus* and *differentia*,] there is [next presented] an aphorism with a view to explaining the object-matter [of the treatise] and the relation† [between the treatise and that object-matter].

Enunciation of the Categories, the Knowledge of which is to lead to Emancipation.

धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्व्यगुणकर्मसामान्य-
विशेषसमवायानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां
तत्त्वज्ञानाग्निःश्रेयसम् ॥ ४॥

No. 4.—Emancipation [is to be attained] through the Knowledge of truth, produced by a particular Kind of duty [—that explained under No. 4. g—] which [knowledge of truth] specially relates to the agreements and disagreements of [the Six Categories, referred to at f., which Categories are] Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Distinction, and Concretion.

a.—Such a knowledge of truth is dependent on the Vais'eshika doctrine; therefore [do we assert that] it also [—viz., that

* —यद्वा तदिति सन्निहितं धर्मेण परामुञ्चति ॥

† —शिक्षाकांक्षानुरोधेन स्वरूपतो सद्यतस्य धर्मं व्याख्याय-
निधेयसम्बन्धप्रतिपादनाय सूचम् ॥

‡ —एतादृशं तत्त्वज्ञानं वैशेषिकशास्त्राधीनमिति तस्यापि
निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वं दृष्टापूपितम् ॥

this doctrine—] is a means of emancipation—just as a staff with cakes‡ [—tied in a bundle to the end of it, to be carried on a journey—may be spoken of as a means of sustenance, for when the staff is brought then the *cakes* are brought].

b.—[In accordance with the established opinion, among Hindú commentators, that it is proper to point out not merely what is the object-matter of the book and what is the motive for attending to the matter, but also what is the *relation* of the book to its object-matter, and who is the person concerned in the enquiry—the commentator informs us that] here it is to be understood that the relation between this doctrine and emancipation is that of cause and effect; between this doctrine and the knowledge of truth, that of an instrument and its operation; between emancipation and the knowledge of truth, that of effect and cause; and between the Categories ‘Substance &c.’ and the doctrine, that of matter for exposition and expositor*.

A dispute concerning
the nature of Eman-
cipation.

c.—[The commentator then enters into a long discussion of the opinions current respecting the nature of ‘emancipation’.

He denies that this consists in absorption into Brahma—for, he argues,] if you say that ‘emancipation’ is the absorption of the human soul into the divine soul, then this is absurd—if by ‘absorption’ you mean the becoming *one*—for *two* never become *one* [of the same kind]. And the opinion of the *Ekadāṇḍins* [—those who, unlike the bearers of the triple staff, carry a

* —तद्वचः शास्त्रनिःश्रेयसवोर्हेतुहेतुमद्भावः । शास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञानयोर्व्यापारिव्यापारभावः । निःश्रेयसतत्त्वज्ञानयोः कार्यकारणभावः । इत्यादिपदार्थशास्त्रयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावः सम्बन्धोऽवगम्यते ।

single staff as an emblem of their belief in but one reality—viz. Brahma or the Absolute—] is to be rejected—[the opinion viz.—] that “ ‘Absorption’ is the departure of the ‘subtile body’ “and the ‘subtile body’ is [the aggregate of] the eleven organs “[—see Lecture on the *Sāṅkhya* No. 29] and “ the departure “[we say] of these and of the [gross] body is absorption,”—[this opinion of the *Ēkādāṇḍins* is to be rejected] because of the non-existence of any proof that Soul *does* consist of Knowledge and of Joy [as the followers of the Vedānta assert that it does]. And this scripture is no proof of it—viz.—“ Brahma is the eternal, knowledge, and joy”—for this [when correctly interpreted] declares His *possession* of knowledge and his *possession* of joy [—not his being made up thereof] ;—for [—as every one knows—] there is such a feeling as “I know” or “I am happy,” but not such a one as “I am knowledge” or “I am joy.” *

d.—Moreover it turns out [—if we admit the tenet of the Vedānta that nothing really exists except Brahma—] that there is no difference between one emancipated and one mundane [or

*—ब्रह्मात्मनि जीवात्मनो मुक्तिरिति चेत् । लभ्यो बह्वेकीभावस्तदा बाधात् । न हि द्वयमेकं भवति । लिङ्गशरीरापगमो लभ्यो लिङ्गश्च कादशेन्द्रियाणि तेषां शरीरस्य च विगमो लभ्य इति त्वेकदण्डिमतमपास्तम् । आत्मनो ज्ञानत्वे सुखत्वे च प्रमाणाभावात् । न च नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति श्रुतिमनिम् । तस्या ज्ञानवत्वामन्दवत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । भवति हि अहं जाने अहं सुखीति प्रतीतिर्न त्वहं ज्ञानमहं सुखमिति ॥

still in the flesh] because each, [on that view of the case] even now, *is* Brahma. *

e.—[After some other remarks which we omit, the commentator says] the *cessation of pain*, [that cessation being] of the kind that has been described, [viz absolute] is the ‘*summum bonum*.’†

f.—[With reference to the construction of the words in the aphorism—No. 4—he tells us that] in the expression “knowledge of truth” the sixth [or genitive] case has the force of the objective; and in the expression “agreements and disagreements” the third [or instrumental] case has the force of specification ‡ [—the knowledge being of that *kind* which the expression in the third case denotes].

g.—[In the aphorism—No. 4—] the expression “produced by a particular kind of duty” qualifies [or particularises] the expression “knowledge of truth.” Here the particular kind of duty is that of *forbearance* § [—see No. 2. b.—]

h.—But if [—contrary to the analysis adopted under No. 4.

*—किंश्च ब्रह्मण इदानीमपि सत्त्वात् मुक्तसंसारिणोरविशेषो
वापत्तिः ॥

†—दुःखनिवृत्तिरेवोक्तस्या निःशेषमिति ॥

‡—तत्त्वस्य ज्ञानमिति कर्मणि षष्ठो । साधर्म्यविधर्म्याभ्या-
मिति प्रकारे तृतीया ॥

§—धर्मविशेषप्रसूतादिति तत्त्वज्ञानादित्यस्य विशेषणम् । तच्च
धर्मविशेषो निवृत्तिरूपस्यो धर्मः

f.—] it is the *doctrine* that is meant by the expression [which has been rendered] “knowledge of truth”—because “truth is known thereby” [i. e. by means of the doctrine,] then the “particular kind of duty” [of which we have given our own view under No. 4. *g.*] must be interpreted to consist in the ascertainment of and the grace of God—for it is a matter of tradition that “The great saint, KAYADA, having attained to the ascertainment and to the grace of God, revealed his doctrine.”*

i.—And here, by “knowledge of truth” we mean to say the beholding of Soul—since thereby alone is it possible for imaginary and false knowledge to be rooted out.†

j.—Now, enunciating the species included in the category of ‘Substance,’—the one enounced first [in No. 4.] in consideration of its being what [alone] attains to emancipation [—since thereupon the other categories vanish—] and of its being the substratum of all the other categories, he [KAYADA] goes on to say :‡—

The Category of Sub-
stances divided. }

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगा-
न्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि ॥ ५ ॥

No. 5.—Earth, water, light, air, ether, time, place, soul, mind—such are the Substances.

* —यदि तु तत्त्वं ज्ञायते अनेनेति तत्त्वज्ञानं शास्त्रमुच्यते तदा धर्मविशेष ईश्वरनियोगप्रसादरूपो वक्तव्यः । अयमेव ईश्वरनियोगप्रसादावधिगम्य कथादो महर्षिः शास्त्रं प्रणीतवानिति ॥

† —तत्त्वज्ञानश्चात्मसाक्षात्कार इव विवक्षितस्तस्यैव सवास-
नमिथ्याज्ञानोन्मूलनक्षमत्वात् ॥

‡ —इदानीमपवर्गमागितया सर्वपदार्थाश्रयतयाच प्रथमोद्दिष्ट-
स्य द्रव्यपदार्थस्य विशेषोद्देशं कुर्वन्नाह ॥

a.—The expression “such” (*iti*) is intended to make the assertion definite :—therefore the meaning is, that there are just nine Substances and not nine and more.*

b.—But [some one may object that] “Gold is not earth because “it is without odour [which—see the *Tarka-sangraha* p. 5.—is “held to be the characteristic of earth]—nor is it water because it “is devoid of viscosity and of natural fluidity; nor is it fire “because of its weight—and, for the same reason neither is it air “or ether [both of which are held to be devoid of weight];— “therefore it is different from all the nine [enumerated in No. ‘5.]”—if [you say this—then I, the commentator, say] No :— your first two reasons are valid [against gold’s being earth or being water], but your third is a case of [the fallacy termed] ‘unreality of the alleged nature†’—[for the followers of this doctrine hold that gold is not really heavy in *itself*, but appears to be heavy through its admixture with earthy particles—and] the gold itself is composed of fire or light.‡

c.—Qualities—in the shape of some quality or another—[—not all qualities in all cases—] reside in all Substances, they are the

* —इतिकारो ऽवधारणार्थः । तेन नवैव द्रव्याणि नाधिकानि नवेत्यर्थः ॥

† —ननु सुवर्षं न तावत् पृथिवी निर्गन्धत्वात् । न जलं चैवसांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वभ्रूयत्वात् । न तेजो गुरुत्वात् । अत एव न वायुर्नवाकायादि । ततो नवम्य भिद्यत इति चेत् । न । आद्य-योरनामासत्वं तृतीयस्य स्वरूपासिद्धत्वम् ॥

‡ —सवर्षं स्व तैजस्वम् ॥

characteristics of the Substances, and it is they which render Substances cognizable;—therefore, immediately after the Substances, he enunciates and divides the Qualities* [as follows]:—

The Category of
Quality divi-
ded.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शः संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्
संयोगविभागी परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे
इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः । ६ ।

No. 6.—Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Numbers, Magnitudes, Severalty, Conjunction and Disjunction, Distance and Proximity, Thoughts, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Efforts and [others] are the Qualities.

a.—By the “and” he adds [to this list] Weight, Fluidity Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit, and Sound; for these are notoriously known to be Qualities, and therefore he did not mention them by word of mouth.†

b.—And [-next-] Actions are things perceptible, because they owe their existence to Substances and to Qualities, and they inhere in coloured [and therefore perceptible] Substances;—therefore, immediately after the naming of the Substances and the Qualities, he enunciates and divides the Category of] Action‡ [as follows]:—

* —गुणत्वेन रूपेण गुणानां सर्वद्रव्याश्रितत्वं द्रव्यसिद्धत्वं द्रव्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वमेति द्रव्यावन्तरं गुणानामुद्देशं विभागश्चाह ॥

† —चकारेण गुणत्वद्रवत्वद्वेषलक्ष्णारचमधिर्नशब्दान् चसुचिमेति । ते हि प्रसिद्धगुणमावा एवेति कथ्यतो नोक्ताः ।

‡ —कर्मणाञ्च द्रव्यजन्यतया गुणजन्यतयाच कर्मिद्रव्यसमवायाच्च प्रत्यक्षतेति द्रव्यगुणाभिधानानन्तरं कर्मोद्देशविभागश्चाह ॥

The Category of } उल्लेख्यमपक्षेप्यमाकुञ्चनप्रसारणङ्गमनमि-
Action divided. } ति कर्माणि । ७ ।

No. 7.—Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, Motion—such are the Actions.

a.—The “such” [—conf. No. 5. a.—] is intended to make the assertion definite;—for *whirling* &c., too are not distinct from *Motion*, [and are not therefore omitted in the enumeration.] And here the kinds [of Action called] Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, & Motion, are clearly five species included under Action.*

b.—[This division of ‘Action’ is objected to by others, on the ground that ‘Action’ and ‘Motion’ are convertible terms,—so that the citation of ‘Motion’ as one member in the division of ‘Action’ is nothing else than the citation of ‘Motion’ as one member in a five-fold division of ‘Motion’ itself. In the commentary before us this objection is treated voluminously. A more concise solution of the difficulty is offered in the *Dināṭari*, a commentary on the *Siddhānta-muktāvali* which is a commentary on the popular text-book the *Bhāṣā-parichchheda*. The author of the *Dināṭari*, stating the opinion of the objector, says—]—now, since we can obtain ‘Elevation’, and the rest, from ‘Motion’ simply, the division [of ‘Action’] into ‘Elevation &c.’ is improper. Nor [can you say that] the fact of their being ‘Motion’ is not discernible in ‘Elevation’ and the others,—for, in the case of a clod,

*—इतिरवधारणार्थः । अमबादेरपि गमनादव्यतिरेकात् । च-
क्षोः उल्लेख्यत्वापक्षेप्यत्वाकुञ्चनत्वप्रसारणत्वगमनत्वानि कमत्वं
वाचादव्याख्याः पक्ष्य जातवः ।

or the like, elevated upwards or depressed downwards, the conviction [—if there be any—] is—that it *goes* upwards, or it *goes* downwards [—so that there is a *going*—or ‘Motion’—in either case—];—but if you say this [—resumes the author of the *Dinātri*—] it is not as you say—for one must not [presume to direct a great sanctified sage [like *Kaṇāda*] whose will is independent* [and who may divide ‘Action’ according to his own good pleasure.]

c.—Next after the topic of the enunciation of ‘Substance’ &c., [—see § 5 &c.—] the topic of the *communities of character* belonging to the three [—viz. to substance, quality, and action,—] begins. Here, since the disciple is on the look out for the ‘communities of character’ belonging to the three, because these [—see —§ f. in the Introduction—] conduce to the ‘knowledge of truth [which—see § e—leads eventually to emancipation],—even before enunciating the [remaining] three categories, beginning with ‘Sameness’ he mentions the communities of character belonging to the [first] three †—as follows.

In what respect Substance Quality and Action do not differ from one another.

सद्वर्तित्वं द्रव्यवाक्यायं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामविशेषः । ८ ।

*—अथैवमुत्क्षेपवादीनामपि गमनादेव साधे उत्क्षेपवत्त्वादिति विविर्भागो ऽनुचितः । नवा उत्क्षेपवादी गमनत्वं नातुभाविकं । अहंमधस्य प्रविशसोष्ठादी अहं गच्छति अधो गच्छतीति प्रत्यवादिति चेन्न सतम्येष्वस्य मधर्मेर्निबन्तुमशक्यत्वादिति ।

†—द्रव्यादीनामुद्देश्यपकरणान्तरं जगतां साधर्म्यप्रकरणमारभ्यते । तत्र द्रव्यादीनां जगतां साधर्म्यस्य तत्त्वज्ञानानुसृतत्वा

No. 8.—The indifference Substances, Qualities, and Actions, in this that they are entities, not eternal, inhering in Substances, effects, causes, and having [—or being the only loci of—] genus & subordinate difference.

a.—The word 'indifference' means merely a 'community of character' [which may exist, &, in the case of the three categories in question, does exist] even where 'difference' also exists.*

b.—'Entities'—i. e. these three alone are the objects in regard to which the belief is entertained that they do exist—[and this belief is entertained] because these are associated with existence.†

c.—'Not eternal'—i. e. the counter-opposite [—and possible victim—] of an emergent non-existence [—in other words something liable to destruction.] Although this character is not common to Atoms or the Ether &c.,—yet what we mean to speak of is the possession of the distinctive character as a category [—this distinctive character being here either that of Substance Quality or Action—] which resides in those things that are the 'counter-opposites of an emergent non-existence'—[—and which may reside, and does, in some that are not such].‡

प्रथमं शिष्याकाङ्क्षितत्वात्, सामान्यादिपदार्थवत्त्वेऽप्येवमात्रेण
चवाच्यं साधर्म्यमात्रं ।

*—विशेषे सत्यप्ययमविशेषवद्: साधर्म्यमात्रपरः ।

†—सदिति सदाकारप्रत्ययव्यपदेशविषयत्वं चवाच्यमेव । सत्ता-
बोधितत्वात् ॥

‡—अनित्यमिति ध्वंसप्रतियोगि । तद्यद्यपि न परमावयवाद्यादि-
साधारणं तथापि ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वनिपदार्थविभावकोपाधिमत्वं वि-
वक्षितम् ।

d.—‘Inhering in Substance’—i. e., ‘Substance’ is the substratum thereof* [—in the absence of which neither a Quality nor an Action could exist—nor an ordinary Substance itself,—seeing that any such given substance as a jar exists only in virtue of the existence of the constituent Substances, e. g. its halves, which furnish its substratum].

e.—[The name of an ‘effect’ does not apply to such things as the Atoms which KANĀDA holds to be eternal; and the redundancy in the definition is explained away like the one in § 8. c.]

f.—Now he states the ‘communities of character’ belonging to Substance and Quality only † [—excluding Action].

How far Substance
and Quality agree,
while differing from
Action. } इत्यनुषङ्गोः सत्तातीत्यनुषङ्गत्वं साधर्म्यम्
॥ २ ॥

No. 9.—It is the common character of Substance and Quality that each originates its congener.

a.—By the next aphorism he renders clear just the present one. ‡

इत्यादि इत्यान्तरमात्मन्ते गुणाय नुचान्तरम् ॥ १० ॥

No. 10.—Substances originate another Substance, and Qualities another [like] Quality.

*—इत्यवदिति च्छब्दं समवायिकारणतया ऽस्यास्तीति द्रव्यवत् ।

†—इदानीं इत्यनुषङ्गोरेव साधर्म्यमग्रहः ।

‡—एतदेव सूचान्तरेण स्पष्टयति ।

a.—[Thus the two halves of a jar originate, or produce, the jar; and the black or red colour of the halves originates the black or red colour of the jar.]

b.—But why then do *Actions* not originate other *Actions*?—In reply to this he says* [as follows].

Action not
the product
of completed
Action. } कर्म कर्मसाध्यं न विद्यते ॥ ११ ॥

No. 11.—An Action is not what is established by an Action.

a.—The verb 'to be' [—in the expression 'An Action is' &c.—] is here intended for knowledge [—that is to say, it is intended—like the 'logical copula' of European logicians—to make one aware that the subject and predicate stand in such and such a relation to one another];—but it does not connote *existence*†.

b.—The meaning [of the aphorism] is, that there is no evidence of an Action's being completed [or definitively resulting] in an Action, as there is of a Substance's or a Quality's in its originated congener ‡—[§9]. [Action, or motion, commencing in the destruction of a former conjunction—i. e. in the disjunction of the body from the place which it previously occupied, is regarded as being

*—अनु कर्माणि कुतो न कर्मान्तरमारभन्त इत्यत्रापि ॥

†—विदिरवं ज्ञानार्थो ननु सत्ताभिधायी ॥

‡—सजातोवारम्भद्रव्यगुणयोरिव कर्मसाध्ये कर्मणि प्रमाणं नास्त्यर्थः ॥

completed in the subsequent conjunction of the body with another locality —see § 14. *a.*].

c.—He [now] states the the *difference* of character in Substance from Quality and Action*—thus.

Wherein Substance
differs both from
Quality and Ac-
tion. } न द्रव्यं कार्यं कारणम् बधति । १२।

No. 12.—Neither effect nor cause slays Substance.

a.—The meaning is—that its own product does not destroy a Substance, nor does its own cause destroy a Substance, because two substances which stand to each other in the relation of source and product [—e. g. yarn and the web formed thereof—] do not stand to each other in the relation of contradictories† [—opposed and opposing.]

b.—‘Slays’—is an ‘aphoristic’ expression‡ [—and the illustrious propounders of aphorisms have the privilege of employing words in ways more strange than would be tolerated in ordinary cases].

c.—He next states that a Quality [unlike a Substance] is destroyed [both] by its cause and its effect. §

*—गुणकर्मभ्यां द्रव्यस्य वैधर्म्यमाह ।

†—द्रव्यं न स्वकार्यं हन्ति नवा स्वकारणं हन्ति । कार्यकारणभावापन्नयोर्द्रव्ययोर्माध्यमाधिकभावे नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

‡—बधतीति शेषो निर्देशः ।

§—गुणस्य कार्यकारणबधत्वमाह ।

उभयथा गुणः । १३ ।

No. 13.—In both ways Quality.

a.—That is to say—it is destroyed by its product and destroyed by its cause. In the case of the first, [second, third,] and following Sounds [generated in succession by the ethereal undulations originated by the sonorous body], and in the case of Notions [succeeding each other in the train of thought], and the like cases, there is an instance of [a Quality's] being destroyed by its own *product* [each successive thought, for instance, being the product and the superseder of the one preceding]. But in the case of the *last* [wave, or the like, which is succeeded by no other], we have an instance of its being destroyed by its *cause*—for [—as our author chooses to view the matter—]the destruction of the *last* [Sound] is due [—since it can be due to nothing else—] to the *penultimate* one* [from which it also took its origin].

b.—[Sound—it must not be forgotten—is here regarded as a *quality* of the Ether, and Knowledge as a *quality* of the Soul].

c.—Having stated that Qualities are opposed by [or cannot co-exist with] their effects and causes both, he next states that an Action is opposed only by its effect.†

*—कार्यवधः कारणवधश्चेत्यर्थः । आद्यादिशब्दबुद्धीनां कार्यवद्वत्त्वं । परमस्तु कारणवद्वत्त्वं । उद्योगत्वेन शब्देनागत्यस्य नाद्यात् ।

†—गुणानां कार्यकारणोभयविरोधित्वमुक्त्वा कर्मणः कार्यमात्र-विरोधित्वमाह ।

कार्यविरोधि कर्म । १४ ।

No. 14.—Action is opposed by its effect.

a.—[The expression *kāryavirodhi*, in the aphorism, is] a *Bahuvrīhi* compound signifying ‘whereof the effect is the opponent.’ [Action is said to be opposed by its effect] because a motion is destroyed by the latter conjunction produced by itself* [—see 11. b.]

b.—Having, in accordance with the wishes of the disciples, stated the communities of character belonging to the three [—see § 7], now, commencing the topic of Definition, † [—see Introduction, f.—], he says—

The definition of Substance.	}	क्रियागुणवत्त्वमवधारयमिति सूत्र्यस्य सप्तम् । १५ ।
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No. 15.—It has Action and Qualities, it is the [sole] intimately united cause [or substratum]—such is the characteristic of Substance.

a.—[The expression, in the aphorism,] *kriyā-guṇavat* means that ‘in it both Action and Qualities reside.’‡

b.—Here the word ‘characteristic’ means a *mark*—a species of *exclusive token* which distinguishes things of the same from things

*—कार्यं विरोधि वस्येति वज्रमोहिः । स्रजम्योत्तरसंयोगनाशत्वात्, कर्मणः ।

†—श्रित्वाकांक्षामुरोधेन साधर्म्यं जवाकाशमभिधायेदानीं सद्यः प्रकरणाभारमनाश आह ।

‡—क्रिया गुणश्च विद्यते ऽस्मिन्निति क्रियागुणवत् ।

of another genus.—By its etymology ॥ signifies ‘that whereby something is recognised’.*

c.—Likewise, the fact of being an ‘intimately united cause’ [or substratum] also is a difference of the category of Substance [alone—see § 18. a.—] out of the six categories† [—§ 4.].

d.—Since the enunciation of the Qualities came next after [that of] Substance, he now states the definition thereof‡ [next after the definition of Substance].

The definition of Quality. } द्रव्याख्यगुणवान् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणम-
नपेक्ष इति गुणसंख्यणम् ॥१६॥

No. 16.—Inhering in Substance, not having Qualities, not a cause of Conjunction or Disjunction if independent—such is the definition of Quality.

a.—‘Inhering in Substance’—i. e. its wont is to reside in a Substance. But this [character] belongs to Substance also, [as well as to Quality, for a jar is as dependent on its two halves for its existence as the colour of the jar is dependant on the Substance of the jar]—therefore he says ‘not having qualities’.§

b.—But still it [—viz. the definition, even thus narrowed—]

*—अथ लक्षणशब्दसिद्धयर्थः समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदक-
व्यतिरेकसिद्धिविशेषवचनः । लक्ष्यते ऽनेनेति व्युत्पत्तिवशात् ।

†—एवं समवायिकारणत्वमपि षट्पदार्थभेदकमेव द्रव्यपदार्थस्य
लक्षणम् ।

‡—उद्देशक्रमभाजगुणलक्षणमाह ।

§—द्रव्याख्यवितं शीलमस्येति द्रव्याश्रयी । एतच्च द्रव्ये ऽपि
गतमत आह । अगुणवान् ।

extends [—where the definition of Quality ought not—] to *Action* [—which resides in Substance—see § 15. a.—and which is not a substratum of qualities—see § 8. c.—]; therefore, he says ‘not a cause of conjunction or disjunction* [—which *Action*, or motion, is—see § 17].

c.—And [yet again, conjunction, which is a quality, *may* be the cause of conjunction—as the conjunction of the man’s hat with his head may be the cause of the hat’s, mediate, conjunction with the ground on which the man stands]—therefore he says [where it is so, it is not] ‘independent [or direct].’ Here, after the word ‘independent’ the word ‘quality’ is to be supplied [—which accounts for the masculine ending of the word]. The sense then is—‘that which, being independent [or unaided by something intermediate], is not a cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions.’†

d.—He next states the definition of ‘Action,’ which —[see § 4—] was enunciated next after ‘Quality.’‡

The definition of Action.	}	एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेषु कारणमनपे- क्षमिति कर्मलक्षणम् । १७ ।
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No. 17. Belonging to a single substance, without qualities, a cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions [and a cause thereof prospectively] independent,—such is the definition of Action.

*—तथापि कर्मण्यतिव्याप्तिरित्यत आह संयोगविभागेष्वकारणम् ।

†—अत उक्तं अनपेक्ष इति । अप्रानपेक्ष इत्यनन्तरगुण इति पुरणीयं । संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षः सन् कारणं यो न भवतीत्यर्थः ।

‡—गुणानन्तरमुद्दिष्टस्य कर्मणो लक्षणमाह ।

a.—'Belonging to a single substance'—i. e. that of which [unlike such Qualities as Conjunction and Disjunction] a single substance is the substratum.*

b.—'Without qualities'—i. e. there is not in this any quality† [of those in the list given under § 6].

c.—'A cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions independent':—here the independentness consists in the [Action's] being independent [—not of Substance, for example, apart from which it cannot exist,—but] of any thing arising subsequently to its own production.‡ [Thus, whilst a Quality, such as Conjunction, can be a cause—say of another Conjunction—see § 16. c.—only through the intervention of another Conjunction,—or whilst a Quality, such as the Weight, Odour, and the like, in the separate halves that are to form a jar, can be a cause—e. g. of the Weight, the Odour, and the like, of the jar itself—only through the intervention of another Quality—the Conjunction, namely, of the separate halves;—Action, on the other hand, is the direct or immediate cause of the Disjunction of the moving body from the place which it quits, and of its subsequent Conjunction with the place which it reaches].

d. He now reverts to the topic of the communities of charac-

*—एकमेव द्रव्यमात्रवो वस्तु तदेकद्रव्यम् ।

†—न विद्यते गुणो ऽसिद्धित्वगुणम्

‡—संयोगविभागेषु कारणमनपेक्षमिति स्तोत्यनवनकारोत्यनिक-
भावभूतानपेक्षत्वमनपेक्षत्वम् ।

ter [belonging to the first three categories], since communities of character serve to establish a distinction [between what possesses and what does not possess these], just as does any definition* [the topic wherewith we are now concerned.]

Substance the substantial or intimate cause of the first three. } द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यं कारणं सामान्यम् । १८ ।

No. 18.—Of Substances Quality and Action, Substance is the cause ; [—such is] a common character [of the three].

a.—That ■ to say—it is, singly, quite equally common [to the three]—as [when one says] “She [speaking of some woman—] is the common mother of the two”.† The meaning is—that in one single substance, as a substratum (or substantial cause) there (may) reside, as products, Substance, Quality and Action‡ —[for example—in the substance of a jar, as a substratum, there may subsist at once the jar itself, the colour of the jar, and the motion of the jar when floating down the Ganges].

b.—He states, as a common character of the three, that their non-intimate cause may be a quality.§

Quality the non-intimate cause of the first three. } समवया गुणः । १९ ।

*—सदृशस्वेतरभेदसाधकत्ववत्साधर्म्यस्यापीति साधर्म्यप्रकरसमुपक्रमते ।

†—समानमेव सामान्यमेकमित्यर्थः । अगमोः समाना मातेतिवत् ।

‡—एकस्मिन्नेव द्रव्ये समवायिकारणे द्रव्यगुणकर्मणि कार्याणि वर्तन्ते इत्यर्थः ।

§—गुणसमवायिकारणकत्वं अगमोः साधर्म्यमाह ।

No. 19.—In two ways a Quality [may be a cause of all the three].

a.—[He means to say that] a common character of the three is this, that they possess that generic character which resides in whatever has a Quality as its non-intimate [or in-substantial] cause.*

b.—Of Substances the non-intimate cause is Conjunction† [—as the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the web. Then again—see *Tarka-saṅgraha* p. 22.—the colour of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the colour of the web.‡ And thus a quality may be a cause 'in two ways'—inasmuch as the quality may be one already existing in the cause—e. g. the colour,—or it may be one existent only in the product—e. g. the conjunction].

c.—That a single action may sometimes produce more effects than one, he thus states§.

A cause may pro-
duce divers ef-
fects. } संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म । २० ।

No. 20.—Of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum [or the manifestation of inertia in what is in motion], Action [—is the common cause].

a.—'Is the common cause'—such is the connection,|| [of this

*—शुद्धासमवायिकारणवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं चित्तमसाधर्म्यम् ।

†—द्वयाद्यां संयोगो ऽसमवायिकारणम् ।

‡—असमवायिकारणं । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य । तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । त० स० ।

§—एकस्य कर्मणः कचिदनेककारित्वमाह ।

||—यमान कारणमित्यनुवङ्गः ।

sphorism, with § 18. in which the words, here omitted elliptically, occur].

। न द्रव्याणाम् । २१ ।

No. 21.—Not of Substances.

a.—That is to say—Action is not the cause of Substances. Why so?—therefore [—since the question may be put—] he tells us,*

। व्यतिरेकात् । २२ ।

No. 22.—Because of its abolition.

a.—‘Because of its abolition,’—i. e. because of the cessation [of Action when completed]. When the Action has been put an end to by the ultimate Conjunction [to which it tended—see § 14, a.], the [new] substance is produced [—as the jar is produced when the two halves, being moved towards each other, have met, and the motion has ceased—]; hence Action is not a cause of a Substance† [—that is to say not a *permanent* and *con-subsisting* cause—for it is the cause of the Conjunction which is one of the permanent and con-subsisting causes of the jar].

b.—Now he mentions the fact that, in the case of a single product, many may have been the originators.‡

। द्रव्याणां द्रव्यकार्त्तव्यसमाख्यम् । २३ ।

*—कर्म न द्रव्याणां कारणमित्यर्थः । कुत एवमत्र चेन्न ।

†—व्यतिरेकोदिति निवृत्तेरित्यर्थः । उत्तरसंयोगेन कर्मणि निवृत्ते द्रव्यमुत्पद्यत इति न कर्मणो द्रव्यकारणत्वम् ।

‡—इदानीमेकस्मिन् कार्त्तव्ये बहुनकारणत्वेनाह ।

No. 23.—A substance which is a product is the common property [i.e. the common result] of substances [more than one].

a.—By 'substances' [in the plural] we mean either two or more. From two threads, a web of two threads originates; and from many threads, a web [as usually met with];—but no web is seen composed of one [straight] thread.*

b.—But then [—the question may occur—] as a substance is the product of substances, and in like manner a quality that of qualities, is an action too the product of actions?—therefore [to prevent such a notion from being adopted] he says:—†

। गुणवैधर्म्यात् कर्मणाम् । २४ ।

No. 24.—Not of Actions [—more or fewer—see § 23 a.—any more than of a single Action—see § 11.], through the difference of their character [in this particular] from that of Qualities—[is Action the product].

a.—'Is Action the product'—such is the remainder‡ [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphorism].

b.—It has been mentioned [at § 9], as a characteristic common to Substance and Quality, that they originate their conge-

*—द्रव्येषु द्रव्यादिषु द्रव्यादि । तेषु द्वाभ्यां तन्तुभ्यां द्वा-
नतुङ्कः पटो रज्जुभिरपि तन्तुभिरेक पट आरभ्यते नत्येकतन्तुको
इपि पटो दृश्यते ।

†—ननु यथा द्रव्याणां द्रव्यं कार्यं गुणानाञ्च गुणसत्ता किं
कर्मणामपि कर्म कार्यमित्यत आह ।

‡—कर्म कार्यमिति शेषः ।

ners. But, with reference to the same point, it was *denied*—by the aphorism [§ 11] viz., “ An Action is not what is established by an Action”—that *actions* originate their like. That fact is re-asserted in the present aphorism :—such is the state of the case.*

c.—Now, pointing out that Qualities which reside in the complex [—or in a complex substratum—] have their origin in more substances than one [at a time], he says†—

Of qualities re-
quiring a complex
substratum. } द्वित्वप्रभृतयः संख्याः दृष्टकं संयोगविभागाः
॥ २५ ॥

No. 25.—Numbers from two upwards, Severalty, Conjunction, and Disjunction [arise from—or require for their production—more substances than one].

a.—‘ Arise from more substances than one’—such is the remainder‡ [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphorism ;—a retrospective regard being had to § 23].

b. But then, as substances that are made up of parts [—see § 23—], and as the qualities before mentioned [at § 25], reside in

*—द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यभूतम् । तच्च कर्म कर्मसाध्यं न विद्यत इति सूत्रेण कर्मणा कर्मजनकत्वं प्रतिषिद्धमेव । तद्विज्ञानूयत इति भावः ॥

†—इदानीं व्याख्ययन्तीनां गुणानामनेकद्रव्यारम्भत्वं दर्शयन्नाह ॥

‡—अनेकद्रव्यारम्भा इति शेषः ॥

what is complex,—why should it not be so with *Actions* also?—
[as this may be asked]—therefore he says*—

असमवायाद्यामान्यकार्यं कर्म न विद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

No. 26.—Action is not the product of a collection, because it does not inhere [—see § 17—in two or more substances].

a.—'Because it does not inhere'—to this is to be added the words 'in two substances or in more.' So then—one Action [numerically one], does not inhere in two substances; nor does one Action inhere in a plurality of substances; therefore an Action is not the product of [or does not depend for its existence upon] a collection—an aggregate.†

b.—In this aphorism too [—as in § 11—see § 11. a] the verb 'to be' is employed for the purpose of *predication*—and does not con-
note *existence*.‡

c.—Agnin [—as at § 23—] he mentions one product as that of *several* § [causes].

। संयोगानां द्रव्यम् । २७ ।

No. 27.—Of Conjunctions—a Substance.

a.—That is to say—of many conjunctions [of separate parts of

*—नन्ववयविद्रव्याणां सुष्ठानाप्सोक्तानां यथा व्यापकवृत्तित्वं
तथा कर्मणामपि किञ्च स्थादत आह ।

†—असमवायादित्यत्र द्रव्यवोर्द्रव्येष्विति बोध्यं । तथाच न
द्रव्यवोरेकं कर्म समवैति । नवा द्रव्येष्वेकं कर्म समवैति । तेन
सामान्यस्य समुदायस्य कार्यं कर्म न विद्यते ।

‡—अत्रापि विदिशानार्थो न सत्तावचनः ।

§—पुनर्वङ्गनामेकं कार्यमाह ।

particles] a [given] substance is the result.*

b.—This is to be understood with the exclusion of those Conjunctions which belong to intangible substances [—such as Time in its conjunction for instance with the jar or the web of today or yesterday—], and to ultimate formations [such as a jar, which is a substance formed of its two halves, but which does not go to make a part of any other single substance], and to heterogeneous substances† [—such as the half of a jar and some threads].

c.—Now he mentions a single result as that of many *qualities*. ‡

। रूपाणां रूपम् । २८ ।

No. 28.—Of colours [one] colour [is the result].

a.—‘One colour is the result’—such is the connection § [which the aphorism requires that we should bear in mind].

b.—The word ‘colour’ in both instances [of its occurrence in the aphorism] is indicative—and the indicative power here is that of ‘a word which does not [—while indicating something else besides—] abandon its own meaning,’ || [—so that whilst the word ‘colour’ here indicates the other qualities in KARANDA’s list of qualities, it continues not the less to denote colour also ;—unlike

*—बहुना संयोगानां द्रव्यमेकं कार्यमित्यर्थः ।

†—निरुपानां द्रव्याणामन्यावयविना विजातीयद्रव्याणाञ्च ये संयोगास्तान् निरावेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

‡—इदानीं बहुना गुणानामेकं कार्यमाह ।

§—रूपमेकं कार्यमित्यन्वयः ।

||—रूपपदबहुभयमपि साधयितुमशक्यत्वात्कार्त्तवेकं दृष्टत्वा ।

the word 'lion' employed to indicate a hero, in which case the word 'lion' ceases to denote a quadruped. See *Sāhitya Darpana* § 14. a.).

c.—For these [qualities], being present in the cause, originate, in the products, one single quality of the same kind*—[as the weight of the one half of the jar and the weight of the other half produce together the weight of the jar formed of these halves].

d.—He now states that a single Action may be the result of a plurality [of causes].†

‡ शुद्धत्वप्रवृत्तिसंयोगानामुत्क्षेपणम् । २८ ।

No. 29.—Of gravity, effort, and conjunction, Elevating [may be the result].

a.—That is to say—Elevating may be the single result of these‡ [three—and it is to be observed that you cannot raise what has no weight].

b.—Here too [—as in § 28. b.] the word 'Elevating' is indicative of [its kindred terms] 'Depressing' &c § [see § 7].

c.—Reminding us merely of [what may have escaped the reader's memory—] the declaration in the aphorism [§ 20]

*—एते हि कारणे वर्तमानाः कार्येषु समानजातीयमेकमेव शुद्ध-
कारभन्ते ।

†—एकस्य कर्मस्य ऽनेककार्यत्वमाह ।

‡—उत्क्षेपणमेककार्यमनीपामित्यर्थः ।

§—अथाप्युत्क्षेपणपदमपक्षेपणादावपि साक्षादधिकम् ।

that "of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum, Action [is the common cause],"—he says—*

What are the results of Actions. } । संयोगविभागश्च कर्मणाम् । ३० ।

30.—Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the results].

a.—'Are the results'—such is the remainder † [required to supply the ellipsis.]

b.—But then [—some one may object] it was declared before [—at § 21 and § 24] that substances and actions are not the products of Actions ;—but it is just Conjunctions and Disjunctions [—see 16. c.—] that have for *their* results the Conjunctions and Disjunctions [which you now allege are the results of Action] ;—and so now your styling Action a cause is contradictory [to your previous declarations]. In reply to this, therefore, he says ‡ :—

। कारणसामान्ये द्रव्यकर्मणां कर्मकारणमुक्तमिति । ३१ ।

31.—In [our discussion of] cause in general, it is of Substances and of Actions that Action has been styled no cause.

*—संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्मेति सूत्रोक्तमेव स्मारकम्व्याह ।

†—अग्रा इति शेषः ।

‡—ननु द्रव्यकर्मणां न कर्मकार्ये इति पूर्वमुक्तं । संयोगविभागौ तु संयोगविभागकार्यावेव । तथाचेदानीं कर्मणः कारणत्वाभिधानं विरुद्धमित्यत आह ।

a.—By the expression ‘causes in general’ he refers to the topic [that he has been engaged upon]. So—when we were on the topic of the mention of causes in general, it was in respect of Substances and Actions that Action was stated not to be a cause ;—but it was not intended to be said that Action was not a cause in respect of anything whatever,—because this would destroy [by making nonsense of] the aphorism [§ 80] viz.—“Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the results”].

b.—So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture in [the commentary entitled] “The Adornment of the Aphorisms of the illustrious and venerable KAṆĀDA.”†

*—कारणसामान्यपदेन प्रकरणमुपलक्ष्यते । तेन कारणसामान्याभिधानप्रकरणे इत्यकर्मणो प्रति कर्मण्यकारणत्वमुक्तं । ननु सर्वसाध्यकारणमेव कर्मोक्तं विवक्षितं चेन्न संबोगविभागाच्च कर्मत्वमिति सूचं व्याचक्षेतेति भावः ।

†—इति श्रीमद्भगवत्पदादसूचीपञ्चारे प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ।

॥ मिरजापुर ॥

॥ यतीने के हाथखाने में हाथी गई ।

॥ सन १८५१ ईस्वी ॥

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